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I. INTRODUCTION
When the ownership of land is divided between one person who has
possession and a second person out of possession who has a security interest
in the land, the secured party often needs protection against improper con-
duct by the possessor. The possessor may remove or destroy an improve-
ment on the land, thereby reducing the value of the security, or he may sub-
ject the secured party and himself to a risk of losing the land by not servic-
ing senior encumbrances or not paying real estate taxes. The common law
doctrine of waste theoretically affords the mortgagee a remedy for any
damages inflicted on the property by the mortgagor before the debt is
discharged.'
Often a mortgagee's ignoranceof his remedies for waste produces no
serious consequences. The prolonged and increasing inflation over the past
several decades, together with the utilization of more sophisticated and com-
prehensive security agreements, usually protect the mortgagee against waste
committed by the mortgagor. 2 If waste occurs, the security agreement may
provide that the mortgagee can accelerate the debt, foreclose, buy the pro-
1. For convenience, the words "mortgage," "mortgagee," and "mortga-
gor" used throughout this Comment also refer to "deed of trust," "beneficiary,"
and "trustor," respectively. This should be kept in mind, particularly in Missouri,
where the deed of trust is used almost exclusively. The dearth of Missouri case law
on the subject of waste necessitates the use of commentators and other state's case
law on many points.
2. See R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 648 (abr.
1968).
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perty at the sale, and, due to the property's increased value as a result of
inflation, resell the property to recover the balance of the outstanding debt.
3
Problems develop, however, for a mortgagee attempting to protect
himself against waste committed on the secured property when the situa-
tion is not as described above. The most complex problems arise when the
parties to a mortgage have not provided for waste or when such provisions
are inadequate or ambiguous. 4 In such cases, the mortgagee will not have
available to him the acceleration, foreclosure, and sale remedy. s Similarly,
the waste may be so severe that it negates any inflationary increase in the
property's value, or the mortgagor may default so soon after the loan that
inflation has not increased the property's value. In either of these cases, even
if foreclosure is available to the mortgagee, it will be inadequate because
the property in its wasted condition will not produce enough proceeds at the
foreclosure sale to satisfy the outstanding debt. In all of these situations,
therefore, the mortgagee must seek either a deficiencyjudgment against the
mortgagor for the unpaid balance of the debt or a personal judgment for
waste. 6 Either way, it is generally accepted that to protect the mortgagee
and to give him the full benefit of his security, he should have all appropriate
remedies for violations of his rights in the mortgaged property. 7 This Com-
ment examines the mortgagee's remedies for waste and concludes that the
mortgagee's three principal remedies in a common law action for waste do
not protect him adequately.
3. Id. See also G. LEFCOE, LAND FINANCE LAW 591 (1969); Leipziger, The
Mortgagee's Remediesfor Waste, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1086, 1087 (1976). This is the ideal
situation for the mortgagee. In this situation, the mortgagee does not suffer any
increased risk or financial loss.
4. See Henchman, Remedies of the Secured Creditor, 10 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV.
20, 20 (1971).
5. See authorities cited note 3 supra. See also Hrovat v. Bingham, 341 S.W.2d
365, 368 (Mo.-App., Spr. 1960) (if mortgage provided no power to foreclose, there
could be no valid sale in attempted foreclosure). A mortgagee with no power to
foreclose following the commission of waste on the mortgaged property would have
only an action for damages or to enjoin future waste.
6. The mortgagee may not seek recovery for both a deficiency on the note
and for the waste committed on the mortgaged property. Randolph v. Simpson,
500 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973). For a discussion of deficiency
judgments in Missouri, see Nelson, DeficiencyJudgments After Real Estate Foreclosures
in Missouri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151 (1982).
7. See generally Wheeler v. Peterson, 331 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959)
(action by mortgagee for damages to mortgaged land due to waste). A mortgagee
has the following remedies for violation of his rights or interests in the mortgaged
property: (1) a right to sue on the mortgagor's personal covenant for repayment
contained in the security agreement, (2) a right to take possession of the mortgaged
property, (3) a right to apply to a court to free the property of the mortgagor's equity
of redemption, (4) a right to foreclose, sell, and sue for a deficiency, if any, (5) a
right to appoint a receiver to collect the rents and profits, (6) a right to enjoin fur-
2
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II. THE ACTION FOR WASTE
The common law action for waste finds its roots in the thirteenth cen-
tury common law8 and statutes.9 The action is the result of ajudicial balance
of the conflicting interests of the mortgagee and the mortgagor by protect-
ing the mortgagee's interest in the preservation of the value of the property
securing the mortgagor's obligation.10 The action requires the mortgagee
to establish three elements: (1) an act constituting waste, (2) done by one
legally in possession, (3) that damages an estate or interest in the land of
another.1 ' The first and third elements have caused the most litigation.
A. Act Constituting Waste
The act of Waste has been variously defined. 12 Most commonly, it is
ther wrongful conduct by the mortgagor, and (7) a right to damages. Greene,
Remedies ofMortgagees, 110 LAWJ. 458,458(1960). See also Lifton, Real Estate in Trou-
ble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW. 1927, 1931-41 (1976) (remedies
under state law). The mortgagee traditionally could pursue his remedies either con-
currently or successively. See Henchman, supra note 4, at 21.
8. See Note, The Doctrine of Waste and California Anti-Deficiency Statutes, 7
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 619, 619 (1977). For a discussion of the historical
background of the law of waste, see R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 2, 637.
9. The text of the Statute of Marlbridge, 1267, 52 Hen. III, c.23, § 2 (1267),
reads:
Also fermors, during their terms, shall not make waste, sale nor exile of
house, woods, and men, nor of anything belonging to the tenements that
they have to ferm, without special license had by writing of covenant, mak-
ing mention that they may do it; which thing, if they do, and thereof be
convict, they shall yield full damage, and shall be punished by amercia-
ment grievously.
The text of the Statute of Gloucester, 1278, 6 Edw. I, c. 5, § 3 (1278), reads:
It is provided also that a man from henceforth shall have a writ of waste
in the Chancery against him that holdeth by law of England, or otherwise
for term of life, or for term of years, or a woman in dower; and he which
shall be attained of waste shall lose the thing that he hath wasted, and
moreover shall recompence thrice so much as the waste shall be taxed at.
10. See Note, supra note 8, at 620. The obligation is usually more important
than the security. An obligation can exist without security, but there can be no
security without an underlying obligation.
11. Jowdy v. Guerin, 10 Ariz. App. 205,208-09,457 P.2d 745, 747-48 (1969)
(elements for common law cause of action for waste set forth). See also Hamman
v. Ritchie, 547 S.W.2d 698, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); cases cited note 14 infra.
For purposes of this Comment, it will be assumed that the mortgagor has lawful
possession.
12. For cases suggesting the variety of definitions of an act of waste, see Finley
v. Chain, 374 N.E.2d 67, 77 (Ind. App. 1978) (overruled on other grounds in Morris
v. Weigle, 383 N.E.2d 341, 345 n.3 (Ind. 1978)); Chapman Drug Co. v. Chap-
man, 207 Tenn. 502, 510, 341 S.W.2d 392, 396 (1960). See a&o 56 AM.JUR. Waste
§ 2, at 450 (1947); Note, supra note 8, at 620.
[Vol. 47
3
Bay: Bay: Remedies for Waste in Missouri Symposium
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
REMEDIES FOR WASTE
defined as unreasonable conduct by the owner of a possessory estate that
results in physical damage to the real estate and substantial diminution in
value of the estates in which others have an interest. 13 Missouri courts have
defined waste as an act that does lasting or permanent physical damage to
the freehold and tends to destroy or lessen the value of other interests in the
property.14 Applying this rule, courts have found waste when the possessor
of mortgaged property cuts timber,15 or removes rocks, minerals, 16 or per-
manent structures' 7 from the land.
Waste may be categorized further as voluntary or permissive. Volun-
tary waste, or commissive waste, is a deliberate act destructive to the mort-
gaged property.' 8 Tearing down a house or removing fixtures constitutes
voluntary waste.19 All states allow a mortgagee to sue for this form of waste. 20
Permissive waste, on the other hand, implies a negligent act or failure to
act that damages the mortgaged property. 21 For example, failure to make
necessary repairs may be permissive waste. 22 Permissive waste may arise,
however, absent physical damage to the property if the mortgagor fails to
pay taxes or service senior encumbrances. 23 Missouri courts rarely have per-
mitted a mortgagee to recover for permissive waste. 24
In order to understand waste, it is helpful to know what does not con-
stitute waste. Waste does not occur when property decreases in value as a
13. Pleasure Time, Inc. v. Kuss, 78 Wis. 2d 373, 381, 254 N.W.2d 463, 467
(1977) (action by mortgagee against mortgagor for waste). See also Halifax Drainage
Dist. v. Gleaton, 137 Fla. 397, 410, 188 So. 374; 379 (1939).
14. Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325, 327 (1860); Miller v. Bowen Coal &
Mining Co., 40 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. App., K.C. 1931); Deltenre v. Deltenre,
152 Mo. App. 487, 491,133 S.W. 632, 633 (K.C. 1911); Hill v. Ground, 114 Mo.
App. 80, 85, 89 S.W. 343, 344 (K.C. 1905); Davis v. Clark, 40 Mo. App. 515,
520 (K.C. 1890). Although not all Missouri cases expressly state that physical
damage is required, the dear import of the decisions is that it is necessary for a waste
action.
15. Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325 (1860).
16. Berns Constr. Co. v. Highley, 332 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1964); Kremer v.
Crase, 209 Wis. 183, 244 N.W. 596 (1932). See Annot., 95 A.L.R. 957, 958 (1935);
Annot., 87 A.L.R. 1008, 1011 (1933).
17. Stevens v. Mobil Oil Corp., 412 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
18. E.g., Dorseyv. Speelman, 1 Wash. App. 85, 88-89, 459 P.2d 416, 418-19
(1969) (removal of windows and cupboards by agents of mortgagor).
19. See generally authorities cited notes 15-18 supra.
20. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text supra.
21. E.g., Dorsey v. Speelman, 1 Wash. App. 85, 88,459 P.2d 416, 418 (1969)
(general dilapidated condition of property due to lack of upkeep and maintenance).
22. First TrustJoint Stock Land Bank v. Abkes, 224 Iowa 877, 882, 278 N.W.
183, 186 (1938). See also Erickson v. Rocco, 433 S.W. 2d 746, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968); Weaver v. Royal Palms Assoc., 426 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
23. See Stevens v. Mobil Oil Corp., 412 F. Supp. 809, 814 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
24. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text infra.
1982]
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result of ordinary depreciation. 25 The "consumption" of the property under
these circumstances is due to age, use, and the normal wear and tear on the
property. Additionally, Missouri courts have held the destruction or removal
of permanent structures or trees that enhance the value of the property not
to be waste because the value of the other person's interest in the property
is not lessened. 26 Also, the mortgagee cannot sue for waste if the use of the
property was one the parties expected when the mortgage was executed. 27
Unless specifically excluded, such an expectation usually permits a mortgagor
to use the land as it was used when the parties executed the mortgage, even
though the premortgage uses involved removal of parts of the mortgaged
property and reduced the value of the property. 2 One court even indicated
that a mortgagor may do any act that an ordinary owner would do, regardless
of whether it would be good husbandry. 29
B. Damage to Mortgagee's Estate or Interest
To sue for waste, a mortgagee must have a sufficient interest in the pro-
perty. This requirement has been the chief obstacle to a waste action. At
common law, the requisite interest for an action for waste was either legal
title or the right to immediate possession." More recently, varying mort-
gage theories have complicated ascertaining whether the mortgagee has met
this requirement.
Adopting English law, many states east of the Mississippi River follow
the title theory. This theory conceptualizes a mortgage as a conveyance of
legal title to the mortgagee on a condition subsequent.3 1 The condition is
usually the repayment of the loan. Until repayment occurs, the mortgagee
retains defeasible legal title to the property, while the mortgagor usually en-
joys possession. If the mortgagor defaults, there is a breach of the condi-
25. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Moulds, 202 Kan. 557, 562, 451 P.2d
215, 220 (1969); Folden v. Folden, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 240, 244, 188 N.E.2d 193, 195
(App. 1962).
26. Adkison v. Hannah, 475 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1972) (removal of timber
enhanced value of farm; no action for waste allowed). See also Proffitt v. Hender-
son, 29 Mo. 325 (1860); Deltenre v. Deltenre, 152 Mo. App. 487, 133 S.W. 632
(K.C. 1905); Thompson v. Thompson, 206 Tenn. 202, 332 S.W.2d 221 (1960).
27. See Mortgages-Mortgagees' Remedy ForDamages to or lnjuy to the Res, 10TEX.
L. REV. 475, 476 (1932).
28. Id. See also Hill v. Ground, 114 Mo. App. 80, 85, 89 S.W. 343, 345 (K.C.
1905); G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 4.4, at 123 (1979).
29. Searle v. Sawyer, 127 Mass. 491, 493 (1879). Contra, Davis v. Clark, 40
Mo. App. 515, 521 (K.C. 1890).
30. See generally Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Pirich, 215 Minn.
313, 317, 9 N.W.2d 773, 776 (1943); 93 C.J.S. Waste § 12, at 568 (1956).
31. Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1089.
[Vol. 47
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tion, and title vests automatically in the mortgagee.3 2 Thus, the title theory
gives the mortgagee legal title to the property, which in turn permits him
to sue for waste after waste occurs. 33
Several states have adopted the intermediate theory. In these states, the
mortgagee has a lien interest in the mortgaged property prior to default. Dur-
ing this time, the mortgagee's right to sue for waste is, therefore, like that
of a mortgagee in a lien theory state.3 4 When default occurs, however, the
legal title and right to immediate possession vests in the mortgagee. 35 The
mortgagee then can sue for waste as if he were a title theory mortgagee.
3 6
A number of states have chosen not to adopt either the title or the inter-
mediate theory.3 7 These states, primarily states west of the Mississippi River,
instead developed the lien theory. 38 Under this theory, the mortgagee's only
interest in the encumbered property is that of a lienholder; he has only as
32. See generally Benton Land Co. v. Zeitter, 182 Mo. 251, 267, 81 S.W. 193,
201 (En Banc 1904); Wakefield v. Dinger, 234 Mo. App. 407, 414, 135 S.W.2d
17, 21 (Spr. 1939). These two Missouri cases contain thorough dicussions of the
title theory and its effect on the property's title and the parties to a mortgage.
33. Dutro v. Kennedy, 9 Mont. 101, 107, 22 P. 763, 767 (1889). See generally
Wakefield v. Dinger, 234 Mo. App. 407, 414, 135 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Spr. 1939).
34. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text infra.
35. Bradfield v. Hale, 67 Ohio St. 316, 324, 65 N.E. 1008, 1013 (1902). In
Pine Lawn Bank & Trust v. M. H. & H., Inc., 607 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1980), the court intimated that Missouri uses the intermediate theory. The
court, however, never used the language "intermediate theory" nor is this theory
necessary to support the holding reached by the court. It is doubtful, therefore, that
this decision will provide precedent for Missouri's adoption of the intermediate
theory. But see Comment, Real Estate Mortgage Theory in Missouri, 6 MO. L. REV.
200, 204-06 (1941). In that Comment, the writer stated that the Missouri cases sug-
gested that Missouri is an intermediate theory state with respect to straight mort-
gages. Id. at 204. While these cases may suggest that Missouri is an intermediate
theory state for actions such as ejectment and trespass, Missouri case law more clear-
ly suggests that this is not the case when the issue is a question of waste. See cases
cited notes 39, 40 & 44 infra. These decisions concerning waste actions seem to pro-
ceed on the postulate that Missouri is a lien theory state.
36. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra. If Missouri has adopted the
intermediate theory, then the problem that exists at all times in a lien theory state
of finding a sufficient estate or interest in a mortgagee would be raised in Missouri
only prior to the mortgagor's default. See notes 41-44 and accompanying text infra.
Thus, the discussion of the lien theory mortgagee's problem of showing the requisite
estate or interest is equally applicable to a predefault intermediate theory state
mortgagee.
37. See, e.g., Benton Land Co. v. Zeitter, 182 Mo. 251, 267, 81 S.W. 193,
201 (En Banc 1904). See also Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1090.
38. For a discussion of and citations of states adopting the lien theory, see Kulp
v. Trustees of Iowa College, 217 Iowa 310, 313, 251 N.W. 703, 705 (1933). See also
Denton, Right of a Mortgagee To Recover Damages From A Third Party For Injury To Mort-
gaged Property In Ohio, 3 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 161 (1937).
1982]
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much interest as is required to protect his security interest. 39 Until the mort-
gagor defaults and the mortgagee forecloses or takes possession, the mort-
gagor holds legal title to the property. The mortgagor can sell, lease, and
dispose of the mortgaged property as he sees fit.4 0
Adoption of the lien theory in Missouri complicated the law of waste.
A common law action for waste requires the mortgagee to have legal title
or the right to immediate possession of the land. The mortgagee in a lien
theory state, however, does not have these interests; the mortgagor has them
instead. 41 To permit an action for waste, however, one lien theory court held
that the mortgagee has an interest in preventing the mortgagor from injur-
ing the property. 42 This conclusion is unsound because a lien theory mort-
gagee does not have a protectible interest in preserving the value of the mort-
gaged property. 43 Missouri and several lien theory states make it clear that
a mortgagee does not have an interest in the land, but rather an interest in
the prevention of any "impairment of the security of his loan." 44
The mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged property is terminable.
Authorities agree that when the mortgage debt is discharged, the right of
action for impairment of the security is extinguished. 45 Missouri courts
theorize that the mortgagee's interest in the property and his right to sue
for waste is incidental to the right to protect the security. 46 One Missouri
court, however, has declared that it
39. For Missouri cases supporting this theory, see Park Nat'l Bank v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 90 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Mo. 1950); Eurengy v. Equitable Real-
ty Corp., 341 Mo. 341, 346, 107 S.W.2d 68, 71 (1937); Missouri Real Estate &
Loan Co. v. Gibson, 282 Mo. 75, 78, 220 S.W. 675, 676 (1920); Craig v. Kansas
City Terminal Ry., 271 Mo. 516, 522, 197 S.W.141, 142 (1917).
40. Kennett v. Plummer, 28 Mo. 142, 145 (1859).
41. See notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text supra.
42. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Clay County, 221 Iowa 966, 969, 267 N.W.
79, 80 (1936) (action by mortgagee for damage to property by licensee of mortgagor).
43. See generally Robinson v. Russell, 24 Cal. 467, 473 (1864); Allison v.
McCune, 15 Ohio 726, 732 (1846).
44. See, e.g., Edelman v. Poe, 267 Ala. 387,389, 103 So. 2d 333, 335 (1958);
Bates v. Humboldt County, 224 Iowa 841, 843, 277 N.W. 715, 716 (1938); Ken-
nerly v. Burgess, 38 Mo. 440, 444 (1866); Randolph v. Simpson, 500 S.W.2d 289,
292 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973); Terry v. C. B. Contracting Co., 388 S.W.2d 349,
351 (Mo. App., Spr. 1965); Van Pelt v. McGraw, 4 N.Y. 110, - (1850); 59
C.J.S. Mortgages § 338, at 465 (1949); Mortgages- Waste-Liability of Mortgagor or His
Grantee To Mortgagee For Impairment ofMortgage Security, 27 MINN. L. REV. 407,408
(1943).
45. Kulp v. Trustees of Iowa College, 217 Iowa 310,314, 251 N.W. 703, 705
(1933); Randolph v. Simpson, 500 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973); Grace
v. Gill, 136 Mo. App. 186, 191, 116 S.W. 442, 444 (K.C. 1909); 59 CJ.S. Mort-
gages § 439, at 676 (1949).
46. Heitkamp v. LaMotte Granite Co., 59 Mo. App. 244, 250 (St. L. 1894)
(mortgagee permitted to maintain suit for damages due to waste after foreclosure
[Vol. 47
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[does] not wish to be understood as holding... that there never could
be a situation where because of the peculiar circumstances the mort-
gagee might be forced to make some deal with the owner-mortgagor
by way of compromise or extinguishment of the debt, in order to
acquire title or possession so as to protect the interest secured...
and still thereafter bring and maintain ... [an action for waste] .47
Thus, perhaps a mortgagee could sue for impairment of the security, even
following discharge of the debt.
III. REMEDIES FOR WASTE
Once a mortgagee in Missouri has established the three essential elements
for a cause of action for waste, three principal remedies are available: money
damages, injunction, and foreclosure.
A. Money Damages
1. Tort Theory
An action for damages developed in England as early as the twelfth cen-
tury. The mortgagee then had little difficulty recovering damages for waste
because he held legal title to the property. 48 Lien theory states, such as
Missouri, found it more difficult to provide a theoretical basis for a tort
damages action for waste. A mortgagee's nonpossessory interest in preserv-
ing the value of the property securing the debt is not the traditional legal
basis for this action for damges. 49 Courts, however, did permit the mortgagee
to sue in tort for waste by characterizing the mortgagor's conduct as a tort
in the nature of waste. 50 Other courts allowed this action on the ground that
the mortgagor had an implied duty not to impair the security.5 1 These courts
and sale because deficiency established). See also Chouteau v. Boughton, 100 Mo.
406, 13 S.W. 877 (1890).
47. Terry v. C. B. Contracting Co., 388 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Mo. App., Spr.
1965). The mortgagee in this case took title to the property in full satisfaction and
discharge of the debt. There was no indication this was done merely to lessen the
damages or expenses or to protect the security.
48. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra. Indeed, even Missouri re-
tains vestiges of the English or title theory influence in the form of statutes providing
for treble damages for waste committed by anyone during a tenant for life or years'
term. See MO. REv. STAT. §§ 537.420-.520 (1978). See also Coale v. Hannibal & St.
J.R.R., 60 Mo. 227, 233 (1875); First Nat'l Realty & Loan Co. v. Mason, 185
Mo. App. 37, 39, 171 S.W. 971, 972 (K.C. 1914).
49. See note 30 and accompanying text supra. See also Mortgages-Deeds of
Trust-Creditor's Action ForDamage To The Security, 17 N.C. L. REV. 291, 293 (1939).
50. See 17 N.C. L. REV., supra note 49, at 293. See also Delano v. Smith, 206
Mass. 365, 92 N.E. 500 (1910); Langdon v. Paul, 22 Vt. 205 (1850); G. OSBORNE,
G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 4.4.
51. E.g., Page v. Lyle H. Hall, Inc., 125 Vt. 275, 280, 214 A.2d 459, 462
(1965) (mortgagor's licensee had duty not to cut and remove timber from mortgaged
8
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then allowed suit for intentional or fraudulent acts injuring the property and
impairing the security of the mortgage. 52 Better-reasoned opinions also sug-
gest that it is logical and practical to permit a tort action for damages for
permissive waste to the extent the physical injury resulting from such waste
diminishes the value of the security. 53 Thus, the weight of authority holds
that this implied duty supports a tort action for damages for either volun-
tary or permissive waste.
54
Missouri and a minority of lien theory states do not allow a mortgagee
this tort action for permissive waste. 55 These states hold that as long as the
mortgagor refrains from acts that impair the security, he is not required to
maintain the value of the security, absent specific convenants in the mort-
gage so stating.56 This holding fails to recognize that a mortgagor's failure
to maintain the property often results not only in normal wear and tear, but
also in a pronounced dilapidation of the security. Denying the mortgagpe
an action for damages for permissive waste when the results of this waste
are equally as destructive as voluntary waste is unfair to the mortgagee who
contracted to rely on this property as security for his loan.
2. Contract Theory
In addition to a tort theory for damages, a mortgagee may recover
damages for waste under a contract theory. Typically, covenants against
waste are included in the mortgagee's security agreement. These covenants
property). Accord, Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325, 327 (1860); Kennett v. Plum-
mer, 28 Mo. 142, 146 (1859). See also Finley v. Chain, 374 N.E.2d 67, 77 (Ind.
App. 1978) (overruled on other grounds in Morris v. Weigle, 383 N.E.2d 341, 345
n.3 (Ind. 1978)); Kimberlin v. Hicks, 150 Kan. 449, 455, 94 P.2d 335, 339-40
(1939); Gardner v. W. M. Prindle & Co., 185 Minn. 147, 151, 240 N.W. 351, 353
(1932); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 334, at 459 (1949). This implied duty not to impair
the adequacy of the security exists concurrently with the mortgagor's right to ex-
ercise all acts of ownership, even to the commission of acts that might constitute
waste, provided he does not render the debt secured by the mortgage unsafe. See
notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
52. E.g., Hubinger v. Central Trust Co., 94 F. 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1889)
(removal and sale of valuable fixtures from security).
53. E.g., Finley v. Chain, 374 N.E.2d 67, 79 (Ind. App. 1978) (overruled on
other grounds in Morris v. Weigle, 383 N.E.2d 341, 345 n.3 (Ind. 1978)) (waste
committed by failing to keep property repaired when result was rendering portion
of debt unsafe).
54. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 334, at 459-60 (1949).
55. See Logan v. Wabash W. Ry., 43 Mo. App. 71, 75-76 (St. L. 1890) (dic-
tum); Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1104.
56. E.g., Syracuse Say. Bank v. Onondaga Silk Co., 171 Misc. 993, 995, 14
N.Y.S.2d 356, 358 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (mortgagee permitted to sue mortgagor's
grantee for waste because grantee had assumed mortgage with covenants requir-
ing maintenance of property). Seealso Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, 132 N.J. Eq.
97, 102, 26 A.2d 865, 869 (1942).
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are used in lien theory states for several reasons. First, covenants are used
to create remedies that title theory states would give to mortgagees by vir-
tue of their legal title or right to immediate possession.5 7 Second, covenants
are used to expand the damages action to include permissive waste as well
as voluntary waste. 58 Third, covenants are used either to avoid or to mitigate
the consequences of the substantial impairment rule59 of most lien theory
states.
One covenant typically used by mortgagees is the financial covenant.
This covenant requires the mortgagor to pay all or part of the taxes or in-
surance premiums or to service senior encumbrances. 60 From the mortga-
gee's point of view, these financial covenants should be enforced because
there is little difference between an act that results in physical damage to
the property and any other act of neglect that threatens the value of the col-
lateral or the priority of the mortgage.
Missouri and many states, however, do not allow a mortgagee to main-
tain an action for damages for waste merely because of a breach of a finan-
cial covenant. 61 Not only is the breach a form of permissive waste, for which
Missouri denies any damages recovery, 62 courts support their denial of an
action on the ground that with financial waste, there is no resulting physical
damage to the mortgaged property. 63 Thus, a mortgagee's only reliable
remedy for financial waste in Missouri is to advance the funds needed to
pay the taxes, service-the encumbrances, or pay other charges necessary to
protect the security, and then to seek recovery of these advances, either by
a suit for the entire debt or by foreclosure. 64 A mortgagee might seek these
seemingly drastic remedies because courts hold that any sums advanced to
protect the security are secured only by the mortgaged property, must be
enforced as part of the mortgage debt, and cannot form the basis of an in-
57. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
58. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra. This would be true only
in that minority of states, including Missouri, where the mortgagee cannot sue for
permissive waste.
59. See Part IV. infra.
60. See Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1102.
61. Horrigan v. Welmuth, 77 Mo. 542, 545 (1883) (mortgagee denied
recovery for property taxes on mortgaged property he paid); Camden Trust Co.
v. Handle, 132 N.J. Eq. 97, 109, 26 A.2d 865, 872 (1942) (failure of mortgagor
to discharge his pecuniary obligation to pay property taxes not actionable). See also
G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 4.11.
62. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
63. Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, 132 N.J. Eq. 97, 109, 26 A.2d 865, 872
(1942); Ganbaum v. Rockwood Realty Corp., 62 Misc. 2d 391, 396, 308 N.Y.S.2d
436, 441 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
64. Cf Lunsford v. Davis, 300 Mo. 508, 529-30, 254 S.W. 878, 884 (1923)
(with proper covenants, mortgagee can foreclose if mortgagor fails to pay taxes).
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dependent action against the mortgagor. 65 Advancing such funds is a less
than adequate remedy for a mortgagee because after the advance he is pro-
tected against further waste or default by security, the value of which may
be less than the new balance of the debt owed him.
Another contract provision mortgagees use to protect their security or
to recover damages is a repair covenant. Typically, these covenants require
a mortgagor to make repairs necessary to maintain the property in a condi-
tion similar to that existing when the mortgage was executed. 66 These
covenants may expressly require that the mortgagor not commit or permit
waste on the property. 67 Either way, a breach of a repair covenant usually
results in permissive waste because no intentional or voluntary act against
the security has occurred.
For several reasons, the breach of a repair covenant usually is not en-
forced in a damages action for waste. The breach results in permissive waste,
and some states, therefore, will not enforce the covenant as a matter of law. 68
Other courts hold that when a mortgagor demolishes part or all of the ex-
isting improvements, he has not committed waste if the net value of the prop-
erty after completion of the new improvements is equal to the value prior
to the demolition. 69 These courts justify this result on the ground that the
mortgagee has suffered no damages and that equity will not permit strict
enforcement of the covenant under such circumstances. 70 Finally, judicial
enforcement of such covenants is difficult because the court must decide if
the mortgagor should have incurred the expenses of repairs. Courts would
have to assess on a case-by-case basis the wisdom of the mortgagor's judg-
ment in deciding whether and to what extent repairs should have been
made.7 Reluctant to make these assessments, courts generally leave such
decisions to the discretion of the mortgagor, unless the security is substan-
tially impaired. 7
2
65. E.g., Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 33 S.W.2d 1014, 1016
(Mo. App., St. L. 1931) (mortgagee denied recovery for delinquent taxes he paid
on mortgaged property because he was not enforcing entire debt). See also Bingham
v. Zeno, 228 Ark. 1039, 1042, 312 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1958); Stallings v. Erwin,
148 Mont. 227, 233, 419 P.2d 480, 483 (1966); Lawv. Dewoskin, 223 Tenn. 453,
459, 447 S.W.2d 361, 363 (1969).
66. Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1105.
67. Id.
68. See notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
69. E.g., Hellerv. Gerry, 47 A.D.2d 697, 699, 364 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (1975)
(disposals of fixtures during renovation of mortgaged property).
70. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 4.11, at
138.
71. See Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1111.
72. E.g., Erickson v. Rocco, 433 S.W.2d 746, 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
In Erickson, the decision of how and to what extent the mitigation of vandalism on
the mortgaged property would be accomplished was left entirely to the mortgagor.
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It is not entirely fair to the mortgagee for courts to refuse enforcement
of repair covenants. It is reasonable to assume that the parties intended that
the prohibition on demolition would give control over, or at least notice of,
development of the property to the mortgagee. If the mortgagee does not
approve of the demolition, the mortgagee risks noncompletion of the con-
struction that is supposed to follow the demolition. Even if completed, the
building may not provide as much security as the original structure. 73 Fur-
thermore, the mortgagee and mortgagor had bargained for the mortgagee's
ability to have an effective recourse against the collateral, regardless of the
personal financial strength of the mortgagor. By not enforcing a repair cove-
nant when deterioration beyond normal wear and tear occurs, this recourse,
which is the chief purpose of the mortgage, is impaired substantially.
Practically, however, the unfairness to the mortgagee is not as great as
it may appear. Typically, the mortgagor is in default when the mortgagee
notices any pronounced deterioration or waste of the security. The mort-
gagee, therefore, could foreclose. Also, the mortgagee is not without recourse,
even if the mortgagor keeps up his payments and does not lapse into default.
In this situation, the mortgagee could seek an injunction against further waste
by the mortgagor.
B. Injunction
The equitable action of injunction poses fewer problems in Missouri for
a mortgagee than the action for damages. 74 It is thoroughly settled that under
the proper circumstances a mortgagee without legal title or the right to im-
mediate possession of the property may enjoin conduct of a mortgagor in
possession that is injuring the mortgaged property.75 Although there is sup-
port to the contrary,7 6 the better-reasoned approach allows this action,
regardless of the mortgagor's solvency. 77 A mortgagee can sue before the
The mortgagor's decision, which allowed for some continued vandalism, was con-
strued by the court as not a breach of his covenant to keep the property in repair.
Id. See also Camden Trust Co. v. Handle, 132 N.J. Eq. 97, 102, 26 A.2d 865, 869
(1942).
73. See Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1112.
74. See 2 G. GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER SECURI-
TY DEVICES AS TO LAND § 195, at 1005 (1943).
75. See, e.g., Taylor v. Adams, 93 Mo. App. 277, 280 (K.C. 1902) (equitable
interest in property will support action to enjoin conduct that is injuring proper-
ty). See also Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 598, 542 P.2d 981, 986, 125
Cal. Rptr. 557, 562 (1975).
76. See Robinson v. Russell, 24 Cal. 467, 474 (1864) (mortgagor must be in-
solvent before mortgagee can obtain injunction against mortgagor for threatened
waste).
77. See, e.g., Terryv. C. B. Contracting Co., 388 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Mo. App.,
Spr. 1965); City of Toledo v. Brown, 130 Ohio St. 513, 518, 200 N.E. 750, 752
(1936); Core v. Bell, 20 W. Va. 169, 172 (1882).
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mortgage debt is due,78 after default, 79 or during any redemption period. 0
Still, the action is not available as an absolute right. The mortgagee must
show that he has no adequate remedy at law and that his security will be
materially impaired by the threatened waste. 8 1
The significance and use of this remedy has diminished over the years
for several reasons. First, a mortgagee rarely learns of a mortgagor's destruc-
tive treatment of the property before actual waste occurs. Mortgagees rely
on after-the-fact remedies. Second, when a mortgagor's conduct requires
judicial intervention rather than an agreement between the parties for the
cessation of such conduct, the mortgagee reasonably cannot be expected to
be satisfied with a remedy that leaves the mortgagor in possession of the land
and with legal title to it. Third, there has been widespread acceptance and
use of a remedy that ends the debtor-creditor relationship and is quicker and
cheaper than an equitable proceeding.8 2
C. Foreclosure
A mortgagee in Missouri may seek to foreclose the mortgage when the
mortgagor commits waste on the mortgaged property. This action is the most
prominent remedy used today. 3 Foreclosure terminates the mortgagor's
equity of tardy redemption8 4 and is available if the mortgage contains an
acceleration clause. If the mortgagor commits waste, a condition in the mort-
gage is broken and the debt is accelerated. If the mortgagor cannot pay the
whole amount of the mortgage debt, the mortgagee may, in all states, seek
78. Delano v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365,370,92 N.E. 500, 504 (1910); Kalbach
v. Mathis, 104 Mo. App. 300, 305, 78 S.W. 684, 685 (St. L. 1904); Cahn v.
Hewsey, 8 Misc. 384, 385, 29 N.Y.S. 1107, 1108 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
79. Long v. Burnside, 295 Ill. App. 82, 88, 14 N.E.2d 660, 663 (1938);
Kalbach v. Mathis, 104 Mo. App. 300, 305, 78 S.W. 684, 685 (St. L. 1904); Federal
Land Bank v. Jones, 211 N.C. 317, 318, 190 S.E. 479, 480 (1937).
80. Kulp v. Trustees of Iowa College, 217 Iowa310, 313, 251 N.W. 703, 705
(1933).
81. Vybrial v. Schildhauer, 130 Neb. 433, 438, 265 N.W. 241, 244 (1936).
The mortgagee can show no adequate remedy at law because taking possession of
the mortgaged premises by the mortgagee is a remedy of last resort. This is true
because the action imposes severe accounting rules on the mortgagee in possession.
See generally 2 G. GLENN, supra note 74, § 211; G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON &D. WHAT-
MAN, supra note 28, § 4.10.
82. See Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1090.
83. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 7.11, at
446.
84. See Henchman, supra note 4, at 27. The mortgagor's equity of tardy
redemption is his right after default to perform his obligation under the mortgage
and have the title to his property restored to him free and clear of the mortgage.
To do this, the mortgagor must pay the whole amount of the mortgage debt, in-
terest, and other charges now secured by the mortgage due and owing.
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ajudicial foreclosure.8 5 This type of foreclosure is, however, very cumber-
some because of extensive court participation.
In addition to judicial foreclosure, Missouri statutes permit less cumber-
some procedures for mortgagees to foreclose when waste occurs. The par-
ties to a security interest in land may give a power of sale to the mortgagee
when a mortgage is used8s or to the trustee when adeed of trust is used.8 7
As was the case with judicial foreclosure, following the mortgagor's com-
mission of waste, a condition would be broken and an acceleration clause
would make the total amount of the outstanding debt due. 8 When this oc-
curs, the mortgagee or trustee with the power of sale could start foreclosure
proceedings.8 9 These proceedings are similar to ajudicial foreclosure because
there is a sale conducted; they differ because the mortgagee or the trustee
conducts the sale and the sale is not judicially supervised.90 In either a power
of sale foreclosure or the judicial foreclosure, the proceeds from the sale are
applied to the outstanding debt.91 If any deficiency remains, the mortgagee
may sue for this deficiency, basing his action on either the debt or on any
actionable waste. 92 Under either of these foreclosure procedures, the mort-
gagor loses the property. 93 The threat of a foreclosure, therefore, is probably
the mortgagee's most potent weapon against waste.
85. Judicial foreclosure is the best method of determining conclusively the
rights of all interested parties and, consequently, of producing the most marketable
title. This method is, however, the most complicated, costly, and time-consuming
foreclosure method because the court must be involved in and approve of all aspects
of the foreclosure. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28,
§ 7.11, at 447; Nelson, ,ConstitutionalProblems with Power of Sale Real Estate Foreclosure:
A Judicial Dilemma, 43 MO. L. REV. 25, 25 (1978).
86. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.290(1978). This statute only covers giving the
mortgagee a power of sale in the mortgage he is holding. It is settled law in Missouri
that a mortgagee under a straight mortgage with a power of sale, however, cannot
purchase at his own sale, either directly or indirectly, so as to cut off the equity of
tardy redemption. Giraldin v. Howard, 103 Mo. 40, 46, 15 S.W. 383,387 (1891).
For this reason, this statute is rarely used today in Missouri.
87. See Mo. REV. STAT. §443.410 (1978). This statute allows the beneficiary
under a deed of trust to purchase at the foreclosure sale.
88. See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra.
89. State ex rel. Leverage Inv. Enterprises, Ltd. v. Yeaman, 581 S.W.2d 53,
57 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
90. For a more exhaustive discussion on the particulars of a power of sale
foreclosure, see generally Muller, Deed of Trust Foreclosure: The Need For Reform, 29 J.
MO. B. 222 (1973); Nelson, supra note 85.
91. McCune's Estate v. Daniel, 76 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Mo. 1934). See also Ran-
dolph v. Simpson, 500 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Mo. App., K.C. 1973); 59 0.J.S. Mort-
gages § 334, at 461 (1949).
92. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
93. The mortgagor still may have statutory redemption rights, which, if ex-
ercised in a timely fashion, would enable him to retain the property. See MO. REV.
19821
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D. Timing an Action for Damages and Foreclosure
Often a mortgagee may be able to foreclose and to obtain damages. Both
actions are available when the waste not only damages the value of the securi-
ty but also breaches a covenant in the mortgage, accelerates the debt, and
facilitates foreclosure. A mortgagee with both actions available to him must
decide which to bring first. He may bring an action for the damages caused
by the waste prior to foreclosing. Alternatively, he may foreclose, and if the
foreclosure sale results in a deficiency, he may pursue a claim against the
mortgagor for the damages caused by the waste.
Suing first for damages may be advantageous. The action for damages
will give the mortgagee an appraisal of the damage to the property resulting
from the waste. This determination will aid the mortgagee in bidding in a
subsequent foreclosure sale. Additionally, and of indirect benefit to the mort-
gagee, the risk of uncertain or faulty valuation of the damages falls on the
mortgagor. For example, if the property appraisal in the waste action
overestimates the amount of damages, the mortgagee who recovers ajudg-
ment for these inflated damages and thereafter forecloses will bid less because
the damage award reduces the mortgage debt due. 9 If the mortgagee is the
successful bidder at the foreclosure sale, as he usually is, he may recover
more than his outstanding loan when he thereafter resells the property, which
by definition is worth more than his bid due to the inflated damage award.95
A mortgagee may not always prefer to recover damages for the waste
prior to foreclosure. As suggested above, the threat of foreclosure is probably
the mortgagee's most effective deterrent against potential waste because the
possibility of losing the property concerns the mortgagor more than the
possibility of paying damages. Additionally, Missouri applies the substan-
tial impairment rule,9 6 which requires the court to make a difficult deter-
mination of the amount of the waste necessary to support the damages ac-
tion. A mortgagee subject to this rule has a difficult time recovering damages
and, therefore, often resorts to foreclosure. Finally, the recovery of damages
STAT. §§ 443.410-.440 (1978); Comment, Statutory Redemption Following Power of Sale
Foreclosure in Missouri, 47 MO. L. REV. 309 (1982).
94. The mortgagee would be required to reduce the outstanding balance of
the debt by the amount of the damage award. Kulp v. Trustees of Iowa College,
217 Iowa 310, 314, 251 N.W. 703, 705 (1933). This reduced debt would be the mort-
gagee's credit bid in any subsequent foreclosure sale. A credit bid is one for which
the mortgagee does not have to pay cash, but rather is credited with the loan amount
outstanding.
95. See Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1120. The mortgagee is usually successful
at a foreclosure sale because the sale process does not emulate an open market type
sale of property. The statutory required notice of the sale, see Mo. REV. STAT. §
443.310-.320 (1978), normally does not attract many bidders, and as a result, the
mortgagee's credit bid is usually taken and accepted.
96. See Part IV. infra..
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leaves the security in the possession of a less solvent, unreliable, and wrong-
doing mortgagor. This may be unacceptable to the mortgagee.
Some authorities suggest that a mortgagee may be required to foreclose
prior to seeking damages for waste that the mortgagor has committed. 97
These authorities reason that if the waste is not severe, the mortgagee could
buy the property at the foreclosure sale for the amount of the outstanding
debt and then resell the property at cost or possibly even at a profit.9 in
this situation, therefore, there would be no damages for the waste because
the full amount of the debt has been discharged; the mortgagee has not been
damaged. 99 Additionally, it has been suggested that requiring the mortgagee
to foreclose first would result in more accurate, efficient, and effective resolu-
tions to these waste problems. 100 Foreclosing first would allow the market
place, instead of the court, to determine the diminution in value of the mort-
gaged property due to the waste.10 1 Finally, requiring foreclosure first is ad-
vantageous to the mortgagor because it prevents a prior damages action for
the waste. 102
Missouri's position on the foreclosure first rule is unclear.1 0 3 Early
Missouri decisions indicated that a deficiency following foreclosure had to
97. See 5 D. AUGUSTINE & S. ZARROW, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW &
PRACTICE 5 120, at 42 (1974); Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1119. Cf Logan v. Wabash
W. Ry., 43 Mo. App. 71, 75 (St. L. 1890) (court refused to permit mortgageewho,
prior to entry or foreclosure, had no title, possession, nor right to possession of land,
to maintain action for injury to land). Some states may require by statute that a
mortgagee foreclose first. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 726 (West 1980), which pro-
vides that the enforcement of any right secured by a mortgage must be by an ac-
tion to foreclose the mortgage. As long as the mortgage remains in existence, the
California statute bars an action on the debt prior to foreclosure and arguably bars
any personal recovery for waste as well. See generally Walker v. Community Bank,
10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974); Barbieri v. Ramelli, 84
Cal. 154, 23 P. 1086 (1890).
98. This is possible because the value of the security given is usually greater
than the amount of the loan. Thus, even after some waste, the property's value is
often sufficient to cover the amount of the unpaid portion of the debt.
99. A credit bid by the mortgagee for the full unpaid portion of the debt would
discharge the debt. Once the debt is discharged, there can be no independent ac-
tion for damages due to the waste. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
100. SeeJ. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 2.11, at 53
(1974).
101. But see note 95 and accompanying text supra.
102. This is true, assuming the foreclosure sale does not result in a deficiency
and the debt is fully discharged. This would be the case if the mortgagee made a
bid greater than or equal to the amount of the unpaid portion of the debt, as is often
the case.
103. See Heitkamp v. LaMotte Granite Co., 59 Mo. App. 244, 250 (St. L. 1894)
(court recognized that authorities do not agree on the mortgagee's ability to sue
for waste prior to foreclosure).
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precede a damages action for waste. 10 4 A more recent Missouri case,
however, has suggested that the mortgagee's right to damages for the im-
pairment of his security does not depend on the establishment of a deficien-
cy after a foreclosure.1 05 This reasoning, consistent with the modem weight
of authority, 10 6 also effects the equitable proposition that in order to give
the mortgagee the full benefit of his security, he should be afforded the right
to pursue all remedies available to him concurrently or successively. 107
IV. THE SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT RULE
The availability and effectiveness of the three principal remedies for waste
discussed above is limited by a rule Missouri and most lien theory states ap-
ply. This rule prevents an action for waste until the mortgagor commits waste
that substantially impairs the value of the security. 108 The primary problem
with this rule is determining what constitutes substantial impairment.
A. The Debt Equivalency Test
The standard most often applied when determining the substantiality
of the waste is the debt equivalency test. 109 This standard is premised on
allowing the mortgagee no more security than an amount equal to the mort-
gage debt. 1 0 Following this reasoning, Missouri and a majority of lien theory
states hold that a mortgagor's waste has not substantially impaired the mort-
104. Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Springfield, 346 Mo. 79, 85, 139
S.W.2d 955, 957 (En Banc 1940); Chouteau v. Boughton, 100 Mo. 406, 411, 13
S.W. 877, 880 (1890); Girard Life Ins. Annuity & Trust Co. v. Mangold, 83 Mo.
App. 281, 284 (St.L. 1900). In all of these cases, the mortgagee sought damages
for waste committed prior to foreclosing and after a deficiency had been established
by a foreclosure.
105. Terry v. C. B. Contracting Co., 388 S.W.2d 349, 351 (Mo. App., Spr.
1965) (dictum). This statement, however, is only dictum. In this case, the mortga-
gee took a warranty deed from the mortgagor and, in exchange, gave him a com-
plete release and satisfaction for the debt. There was no foreclosure, nor was there
any indication that the conveyance to the mortgagee was because of any threat of
foreclosure. The mortgagee was denied an action for the impairment of his securi-
ty by the mortgagor because the release he gave discharged the debt.
106. See, e.g., Delano v. Smith, 206 Mass. 365, 92 N.E. 500 (1910); Taylor
v. McConnell, 53 Mich. 587, 19 N.W. 196 (1884); 2 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 695(a) & 696 (8th ed. 1928); 59
C.J.S. Mortgagees § 338 nn.55-58 (1949).
107. See note 7 and accompanying text supra.
108. See generally Kircher v. Schalk, 39 N.J.L. 335, 339 (1877); Jones v.
Costigan, 12 Wis. 757, 762 (1860); Note, supra note 8, at 621 n.14.
109 E.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Redwood Baseline, Ltd., 84 Cal.
App. 3d 662, 682, 149 Cal. Rptr. 11, 24 (1978); Chouteau v. Boughton, 100 Mo.
406, 411, 13 S.W. 877, 880 (1890).
110. Cases cited note 109 supra.
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gagee's security until the waste reduces the value of the encumbered pro-
perty to less than the unpaid balance of the debt."1
The soundness of the debt equivalency test often has been questioned.
For example, regardless of how substantial the injury to the land may be,
the mortgagee may have no action for waste if the remaining property is
of a value equal to the amount of the debt still outstanding.1 1 2 Thus, if the
debt has been reduced over time, a mortgagee may be required to show a
virtually complete destruction of the property before he could sue the mort-
gagor. This result contradicts a traditional principle of mortgages that a mort-
gagee has a right to his security unimpaired until his whole debt is paid and
that he cannot be deprived of any substantial part of his security without
full redress thereof, even though, in its damaged condition, the property is
still of sufficient value to satisfy the mortgage debt.1 13
In fact, the mortgagee can be damaged by adhering to the debt equivalen-
cy test. This is true even though the value of the mortgaged estate after the
injury remains equal to or exceeds the amount of the encumbrance. The
interest rate of the mortgage has been determined by the value of the pro-
perty securing the debt.1 14 Waste, however, causes a mortgagee who has
loaned money at a low rate of interest because of ample security to sustain
a risk that is disproportionate to the interest rate charged.' 5 Also, it will be
difficult for the mortgagee to transfer the mortgage or debt without discount-
ing substantially because of the low interest rate that it bears in relation to
the remaining security. 1 16
B. The Margin of Security Test
The debt equivalency test may be appropriate only when the mortgage
has been or will be immediately foreclosed and the debtor-creditor relation-
ship ends. The mortgagee then is protected if, at the time of foreclosure,
the value of the property at least equals the debt. On the other hand, if the
debtor-creditor relationship continues after recovery of damages for past
waste or an injunction against further waste, application of this test would
conflict with the parties' expectations.117 Mortgagees almost always lend less
than the value of the property securing the loan. The mortgagee, therefore,
expects a margin of security over the amount of the debt. One court even
111. See, e.g., Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 598, 542 P.2d 981,986,
125 Cal. Rptr. 557, 562 (1975); Terry v. C. B. Contracting Co., 388 S.W.2d 349,
351 (Mo. App., Spr. 1965).
112. See 10 TEx. L. REV., supra note 27, at 477.
113. See Denton, supra note 38, at 167.
114. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 28, § 4.4, at 125.
115. See 10 TEx. L. REV., supra note 27, at 478. Therate of interest willvary
as does the value of the mortgaged premises in comparison with the debt. Usually,
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recognized that both the mortgagee and the mortgagor generally expect the
margin of security to increase when the debt is repaid in installments of prin-
cipal and interest.118 In fact, the mortgagee would not have made the loan
absent a difference between the amount lent and the value of the property
and, therefore, this cushion is part of the security. 19 Thus, the debt
equivalency test fails to protect this cushion when a mortgagee is denied a
remedy merely because only insubstantial waste has occurred.
The margin of security test 20 has been suggested in lieu of the debt
equivalency test when the debtor-creditor relationship continues after the
waste action and the property remains in the mortgagor's possession. Under
this test, the mortgagee would be as secure after the injury to the land as
he was before it. When the mortgagor committed waste, the resulting debt-
to-security ratio would be examined. If the new ratio were greater than or
equal to the original ratio when the mortgage was executed, the mortgagee
could not sue for waste. If the new ratio were less than the original ratio,
the mortgagee could recover from the mortgagor an amount to be applied
on the mortgage debt as would make the debt after this application bear the
same ratio to the mortgaged estate after the injury as the original debt bore
to the mortgaged property before the injury. 21 This test would not affect
the mortgagor adversely. 122 He would be permitted to retain possession and
ownership of the mortgaged property. Furthermore, the mortgagee would
be in a much fairer and more secure position. By permitting the mortgagee
to regain his original debt-to-security ratio, this test fulfills the bargained
for and reasonable expectations of the parties.
Not all courts use the original mortgage debt-to-security ratio to decide
the availability of an action for waste under the margin of security test. Some
courts have held that an action for waste exists only if the value of the col-
lateral no longer affords the mortgagee a reasonable margin above the
118. People exrel. Dep't of Transp. v. Redwood Baseline, Ltd., 84 Cal. App.
3d 662, 683, 149 Cal. Rptr. 11, 25 (1978) (court allowed mortgagee to retain con-
demnation award funds because mortgagee entitled to higher, precondemnation
security ratio).
119. See Note, supra note 8, at 621 n. 14.
120. See generally 10 TEX. L. REV., supra note 27, at 482.
121. See id. For example, E loaned $5,000 to Rand as security took amortgage
on R's land worth $10,000. Later, R injured the mortgaged property to the extent
of $5,000. Under the debt equivalency test, E would have no action for waste because
the value of the remaining property is equal to the balance of the outstanding debt.
Under the suggested test, E would recover $2,500 and apply this on the debt. The
debt would then be reduced to $2,500 and would bear the same ratio to the remain-
ing property after injury as the original debt did to the mortgaged property as it
stood at the time of the execution of the mortgage.
122. This would be true notwithstanding a possible liquidity crisis that may
arise anytime a monetary recovery is extracted from a person.
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amount of the debt. 123 Older cases have held that a reasonable margin ex-
ists when the value of the property after the waste is at least one-third more
than the amount of the loan.129 Others have stated that a reasonable margin
of security is that which a conservative, prudent lender would expect to
have125 or that margin which the current practices of today's lenders
require. 126 Finally, one court indicated that the parties to a mortgage do not
bargain for maintenance of the margin of security existing at the inception
of the transaction, but rather a margin determined thereafter, immediate-
ly before the commission of the waste. 27
Not all of the margin of security tests described above are fair to the mort-
gagor. For example, the prewaste margin of security test probably over-
protects the mortgagee. Due to the widespread use of periodic installment
loans, the amount of the debt unpaid just prior to the commission of waste
could be very small compared to the value of the security. To allow a recovery
by the mortgagee for waste simply because the postwaste debt-to-security
ratio is now larger than the low prewaste ratio would be unfair to the mort-
gagor. The mortgagee could recover against the mortgagor based on a
margin of security for which he did not bargain. This recovery would put
the mortgagee in a more secure position than he could have expected when
he executed the mortgage.
V. CONCLUSION
A mortgagee in Missouri theoretically can sue a mortgagor who injures
the mortgaged property for waste. This action, however, does not adequately
protect the mortgagee because of the manner in which the three principal
remedies for waste are applied in Missouri. The mortgagee's attempts to
improve his remedy of damages by using appropriate covenants have been
met by a reluctance in Missouri courts to enforce them. Missouri courts also
have denied relief for permissive waste, regardless of how substantial it may
be. Similarly, such injunctive relief as may be granted to the mortgagee is
inadequate because the mortgagee is usually unaware of the waste while it
is occurring and normally relies on after-the-fact remedies. Therefore, the
only remedy that a mortgagee really can rely on is a foreclosure action. This
remedy, however, is available to a mortgagee only if the mortgage instru-
ment allows foreclosure for waste.
123. See Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1099. This standard should be unacceptable
because of its vagueness. The courts would be left to determine what margin of
security would be "reasonable." This should not be necessary because the parties
themselves made this determination when they executed the loan.
124. E.g., King v. Smith, 67 Eng. Rep. 99, 101 (Ch. 1843).
125. Moriarty v. Ashworth, 43 Minn. 1, 2, 44 N.W. 531, 532 (1890).
126. Leipziger, supra note 3, at 1099.
127. People ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Redwood Baseline, Ltd., 84 Cal. App.
3d 662, 682, 149 Cal. Rptr. 11, 24 (1978).
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Moreover, the availability of any remedy for waste in Missouri is sub-
ject to an initial determination of whether the waste has substantially im-
paired the security. While the current standard for making this determina-
tion, the debt equivalency test, is sound for the foreclosing mortgagee, it
is not sound for a mortgagee who expects the debt to continue. In this latter
situation, the debt equivalency test forces the mortgagee to be exposed to
new, unacceptable risks for which he neither bargained nor reasonably ex-
pected. In such a situation, Missouri should preserve the mortgagee's security
and apply some form of the margin of security test for determining if the
waste has substantially impaired the security.
JEFFREY S. BAY
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